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Abstract 
Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been established as one prominent 
explanation for the equity premium puzzle. In this paper we address two issues 
related to the effects of MLA on risky investment decisions. First, we assess the 
relative impact of feedback frequency and investment flexibility (via the 
investment horizon) on risky investments. Second, given that we observe 
higher investments with a longer investment horizon, we examine conditions 
under which investors might endogenously opt for a longer investment horizon 
in order to avoid the negative effects of MLA on investments. We find in our 
experimental study that investment flexibility seems to be at least as relevant as 
feedback frequency for the effects of myopic loss aversion. When subjects are 
given the choice to opt for a long or short investment horizon, there is no clear 
preference for either. Yet, if subjects face a default horizon (either long or 
short), there is rather little switching from the one to the other horizon, showing 
that a default might work to attenuate the effects of MLA. However, if subjects 
switch, they are more often willing to switch from the long to the short horizon 
than vice versa, suggesting a preference for higher investment flexibility. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been introduced by Benartzi and 
Thaler (1995) to explain the puzzling evidence that stock markets offer an abnormally 
high equity premium, which is known as the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and 
Prescott, 1985). In this paper, we focus on two major research questions related to 
MLA. First, we examine whether MLA is rather caused by differences in the feedback 
frequency that subjects receive on their investments or by differences in the investment 
horizon of subjects. We find in our experimental investigation that the length of the 
investment horizon is critical. Given this finding, we address, second, how MLA can be 
contained or attenuated. Hence, we look for behavioral interventions that make subjects 
opt for longer investment horizons in order to avoid the negative effects of MLA. It 
turns out that setting a (long) default investment horizon does the trick. 
Myopic loss aversion relies on two behavioral hypotheses: (i) loss aversion, i.e. that 
individuals’ disutility from suffering a loss is higher than the utility from receiving an 
equally high gain (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), 
and (ii) mental accounting, with the latter implying for financial decision making that 
long term investments are evaluated according to their short term returns (see 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1985). Assuming that investors suffer from 
MLA, an abnormally high equity premium can be rationalized in that stocks are 
relatively unattractive for the investors due to the fact that stock prices fluctuate and 
generate not only frequent gains, but also losses. Based on econometric estimations of 
real financial markets data, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) have argued that the size of the 
equity premium is consistent with investors who weigh losses two times larger than 
gains and evaluate their portfolios on an annual basis. 
In contrast to this indirect test of MLA, several experiments have tried to provide 
direct evidence of the phenomenon. Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman and Schwartz (1997) 
conducted an experiment where subjects could invest in two funds, a low risk and return 
fund corresponding to a real five-year bond, and a high risk and return fund mimicking a 
stock-index fund.1 Subjects had to learn about risk and return distributions with 
                                                 
1
 Expected returns were positive for both funds. 
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experience. When providing feedback, investment returns were aggregated to reflect a 
monthly, yearly or five-yearly horizon depending on the treatment. Results showed that 
investment in the more risky fund was highest in the five-yearly condition followed by 
the yearly condition. The aggregation of outcomes apparently was enough to reduce the 
experience of losses and thus, to increase investment levels. 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) conducted a similar paper and- pencil experiment 
demonstrating the same effect. Participants were confronted with twelve rounds in 
which they could invest their endowment of 200 Dollar-Cents. The investment 
opportunity was a risky lottery with a probability of two thirds to lose the amount and a 
probability of one third to win 3.5 times the amount invested. Two treatments were 
considered: in the “high” treatment, subjects could decide how much to invest in every 
round and received feedback about the return after each round. In the “low” treatment, 
subjects could decide on their investment amount only every third round (which was 
then fixed for the next three rounds) and also received aggregated feedback after three 
rounds, so that gains or losses could not be attributed to a particular round. In the “low” 
treatment, subjects invested significantly more in the risky lottery than in the “high” 
treatment demonstrating that a longer evaluation period makes a risky option with 
positive expected return look more attractive. This finding has been replicated in several 
other experiments, like in the context of an asset market (Gneezy, Kapetyn and Potters, 
2003), in a repeated choice task with minimal information (Barron and Erev, 2003), 
with groups and individuals as decision makers (Sutter, 2005), and it has been 
confirmed to exist to an even greater extent in professional traders (Haigh and List, 
2005). 
In most of the previous experiments it has been argued, though, that less frequent 
feedback makes risky investments more attractive, when in fact yet another variable is 
varied simultaneously: the investment horizon or, expressed alternatively, investment 
flexibility. Individuals learned about joint returns over a specific period of time and also 
had to commit their investment for that time span. Thus, myopic loss aversion might not 
only crucially depend on feedback frequency but also on the investment horizon. To 
address this question is the first purpose of our paper. 
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Independently of our study, Langer and Weber (2003) as well as Bellemare, Krause, 
Kröger and Zhang (2005) also examined the relative importance of feedback frequency 
and investment flexibility for MLA. We became aware of their studies only after 
completion of our experiment. Whereas Bellemare et al. (2005) find that solely feedback 
frequency determines the effects of MLA, Langer and Weber (2003) identify the 
investment flexibility as the relevant factor.2 In our experiment, we replicate the design 
of Gneezy and Potters (1997) and can confirm their earlier findings that less frequent 
feedback and lower investment flexibility increases risky investments compared to 
frequent feedback and high flexibility. However, similar to Langer and Weber (2003), 
we find that investment flexibility is the crucial factor for shaping behavior: even if 
feedback on returns is provided frequently, less investment flexibility, i.e. a longer 
investment horizon, increases investments and thus attenuates myopic loss aversion. 
After having demonstrated the importance of investment flexibility, we turn to our 
second research question: if myopic loss aversion distorts investment behavior, how can 
this bias be overcome? Recently, practitioners as well as policy makers have become 
concerned with the adequate design and presentation of investment information in order 
to counter individual biases.3 To design a behavioral intervention, it is, first of all, 
necessary to investigate individuals’ preferences for high or low investment flexibility. 
On the aggregate, we find no clear preference, but subjects choose high and low 
flexibility rather equally often. In order to possibly influence subjects’ endogenous 
choice of investment flexibility we set up another experimental condition where subjects 
were informed about the average payoff previously achieved by subjects with either high 
or low flexibility. Yet, this additional information does not induce subjects to choose 
low flexibility more often either, although low flexibility promises higher returns. 
Finally, setting a longer investment horizon (i.e. low flexibility) as default seems to 
resolve the problem: although free to switch between high and low investment 
                                                 
2
 Note that Langer and Weber (2003) use a multiplicative payoff scheme, which might be closer to real 
world conditions. Yet, whether the payoff scheme is additive (like in Gneezy and Potters, 1997) or 
multiplicative has no effect on the prevalence of MLA. 
3
 One important field of application in this respect is, for instance, the choice of a retirement savings plan 
(Benartzi and Thaler, 2004; Mitchell and Utkus, 2003). 
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flexibility at small costs, most individuals stick to the status quo that they are offered. It 
thus seems that decision inertia can be used to guide behavior to achieve the desirable 
outcome. Remarkably though, individuals rather switch from low to high flexibility than 
vice versa, indicating a slight discomfort with longer investment horizons. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
basic experimental design. Section 3 is devoted to our first research question on the 
possible driving forces of MLA, either investment flexibility or feedback frequency. 
Section 4 presents the treatments addressing our second research question, namely how 
to design a behavioral intervention that makes subjects choose a longer investment 
horizon, i.e. lower investment flexibility. Section 5 reports a comprehensive 
econometric estimation of the determinants of investment levels in all treatments. 
Besides considering the influence of the investment horizon, the econometric model 
captures the influence of past behavior and past realizations of investments. The latter 
aspects have not been taken into account in previous papers on MLA, and therefore add 
further insights into the determinants of investment behavior. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Basic experimental setup 
The experiment consists of 18 rounds. The basic investment task is equivalent to 
Gneezy and Potters (1997). Subjects are endowed with 100 ECU (experimental currency 
units)4 in every round and can decide to keep it with zero interest or invest any amount 
X ∈ [0, 100] in a risky lottery. If the lottery wins (with probability ⅓), subjects win 2.5 
times the amount invested (in addition to keeping their initial endowment). If the lottery 
loses (with probability ⅔), the amount invested is lost. Therefore, the profit tipi  of 
individual i in round t is given as: 






−
+
=pi
3
2yprobabilitwithX100
3
1yprobabilitwithX5.2100
t
i  (1) 
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 100 ECU correspond to 50 Euro-Cent. 
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From equation (1) it follows that if the individual chooses to invest nothing in the 
risky lottery (X = 0), she earns the endowment of 100 with certainty. 
In total, 289 subjects from Jena University were recruited to participate in a series 
of experimental treatments which are described in detail below. Subjects were invited 
for participation by using the recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), and the 
sessions were run computerized using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999). Each of 
the treatments was conducted in a separate session. One session lasted on average for 40 
minutes, and participants earned on average 12.4 €, including a show up fee of 2.5 € 
(SD= 2.7 €). 
 
3. On the influence of investment flexibility and information feedback (Treatment 
Exogenous) 
3.1 Experimental design 
To explore the impact of investment flexibility on risky investments, we fix 
feedback frequency and vary the investment horizon in two groups: In the condition 
with a short investment horizon (H1), participants have to decide on the risky 
investment in each single round. I.e. they have a high flexibility in changing their 
investments. In the condition with a long investment horizon (H3), subjects must decide 
every third round about the level of investment in the next three rounds, subject to the 
restriction that the investment level X has to be identical in all three rounds. Hence, 
condition H3 represents the case of low investment flexibility. 
In both conditions, H1 and H3, participants receive feedback on their investment 
return after every round, i.e. the feedback frequency on investments is high in both cases 
and is not varied. Thus, if it is solely frequent feedback that causes myopic loss 
aversion, more or less flexibility in making investment decisions should not matter and 
no difference in risky investments between conditions is expected. 
However, to be able to compare our findings to the results of previous studies, we 
additionally introduce a third condition (H3F3) with low flexibility (an investment 
horizon of three rounds), where feedback information is provided aggregated for a 
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respective sequence of three rounds. If reporting the aggregated feedback reduces the 
experience of losses, it might have an additional (positive) effect on investments.5 In 
total, 90 subjects participated in this treatment, which we call Exogenous treatment, 
because the investment horizon was exogenously imposed on subjects by the 
experimenter. In each of the three conditions of the Exogenous treatment (H1, H3, and 
H3F3) we had 30 subjects. 
 
3.2 Results in the Exogenous treatment 
Figure 1 displays the average investments in the risky lottery. Overall, subjects 
invest 64.8 ECU in H3, but only 33.3 ECU in H1 (z = 4.05, p < 0.01; Mann-Whitney U-
test). This shows that an increase in the length of the investment horizon (from short in 
H1 to long in H3) increases investments significantly. Hence, lower investment 
flexibility is beneficial for investments. 
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Figure 1: Treatment Exogenous 
                                                 
5
 We do not consider a treatment where subjects could decide on their investments in every round, but 
received feedback only in aggregated form after three rounds, because it seemed implausible from a 
practical point of view. 
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Less frequent feedback in addition to low flexibility (H3F3) has no additional 
effect, though. There is no significant difference between investments in the conditions 
H3 and H3F3 (with an overall average of 56.6) (z = 1.28, p = 0.2). In fact, Figure 1 even 
demonstrates that in each block of three rounds, investments are on average higher with 
more frequent feedback (H3) than with less frequent feedback (H3F3). This indicates 
that it is rather the investment flexibility than feedback frequency that drives the results 
on myopic loss aversion: Less flexibility in modifying investments generates higher 
investment levels even when investment returns, and thus gains and losses, are 
frequently monitored. 
Finally, comparing the condition with high flexibility and frequent feedback (H1) 
and the condition with low flexibility and low feedback frequency (H3F3) allows a 
direct comparison with – and confirmation of – the results of Gneezy and Potters 
(1997). Investments are higher with less frequent feedback and less flexibility (z = 3.14, 
p < 0.01). 
 
4. Designing behavioral interventions to fight myopic loss aversion 
4.1 Treatment Endogenous – Examining investors’ preferences for investment 
flexibility 
If a longer investment horizon is able to attenuate the negative consequences of 
myopic loss aversion, it is important to find out what may induce individuals to commit 
to a longer investment horizon, or put differently, to forgo investment flexibility. As a 
precondition for giving policy advice, it is, however, important to find out subjects’ 
preferences for high or low investment flexibility in a first step. Given that all previous 
experimental studies on MLA and investment decisions have determined the feedback 
frequency and the investment horizon exogenously, there is so far no evidence available 
on subjects’ preferred investment flexibility when they can choose it endogenously. 
Therefore, we examine subjects’ preferences in our treatment Endogenous. 
 
  8 
4.1.1 Experimental design 
In the Endogenous Treatment, subjects can choose their preferred investment 
horizon (H1 or H3) before the first round starts. No further switching is possible 
throughout the 18 rounds. Feedback on returns is provided after every round. 
There are two conditions in this treatment. In the No-Profit condition, we explain 
the game to subjects and then let them choose the investment horizon. In the Profit 
condition subjects are additionally informed about the average profits for the different 
horizons that had resulted in the Exogenous treatment (with 9.35€ in H1, and 10.10€ in 
H3, excluding the show-up fee). In total, we had 53 subjects participating in the No-
Profit condition and 28 subjects in the Profit condition. 
 
4.1.2 Results in the Endogenous treatment 
In the No-Profit condition, 32 subjects (60.4%) chose the short horizon H1 and 21 
subjects (39.6%) the long one H3. Obviously, endogenous choice does not induce 
individuals to commit to a longer investment horizon. In fact, the frequencies of 
choosing the long or the short horizon are not significantly different from a random 
draw, indicating that in the aggregate there is no clear cut preference for either horizon. 
Average risky investments of both groups over the 18 rounds are displayed in Figure 2. 
Although subjects who choose H3 invest, on average, more than subjects who choose 
H1 (53.5 versus 46.2 overall), a Mann-Whitney U-Test can not confirm a significant 
difference between investments. (z = -1.02, p = 0.31). 
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Figure 2: Treatment Endogenous – No-Profit condition 
 
In the Profit condition, each investment horizon was chosen by exactly 14 subjects. 
As expected, the longer investment H3 triggers, on average, higher investments (75.6 
versus 33.4; Mann-Whitney U-Test: z = 3.15, p < 0.01). 
Though the relative frequency of choosing the long horizon is somewhat higher in 
the Profit condition (50%) than in the No-Profit condition (39.6%) the difference is 
insignificant. This means that adding information about the higher profits with the long 
horizon H3 is an inadequate intervention to make subjects choose the longer investment 
horizon (i.e. accept a lower investment flexibility) more often. 
If endogenous choice and the prospect of higher profits does not prompt individuals 
to commit to a longer investment horizon, as would be beneficial, assigning them to a 
longer investment horizon by default may do. This is explored in our next, the Default 
treatment. 
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Figure 3: Treatment Endogenous – Profit Condition 
 
 
4.2 Treatment Default – Setting a default horizon with an option to switch 
4.2.1 Experimental design 
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were assigned by default to either a 
short or a long investment horizon, i.e. to condition H1 or H3. However, they were 
offered the chance to switch from the short to the long horizon or vice versa (after 
having played the first three rounds in the default condition). Switching was possible 
every third round6 at a one-time fixed cost of 40 ECU.7 Compared to the previous 
treatments, the Default treatment offers subjects complete autarky over their horizon 
(every third round), but simply exposes subjects to a default condition at the beginning. 
                                                 
6
 The restriction to switch only every third round was chosen in order to keep investment decisions in H1 
and H3 comparable. 
7
 If someone switches after the third round, the switching costs amount to about 2.6% of his total sum of 
endowments in rounds 4-18. Of course, switching becomes relatively more expense (in relation to one’s 
endowment in the remaining periods), but if a subject has a clear preference for the alternative horizon – 
instead of the default horizon – he should anyhow switch immediately right after round 3. 
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In total, we had 118 participants in Default, of which 60 were assigned by default to 
high flexibility (condition H1) and 58 were assigned to low flexibility (condition H3). 
 
4.2.2 Results in the Default treatment 
Figure 4 displays the cumulative number of subjects switching to the alternative 
condition (from H1 to H3 and vice versa) for every block of three rounds. At most four 
out of the 60 subjects (6.7%) switch from a short (H1) to a long investment horizon 
(H3). Switching is more frequent with the long horizon default, though. By round 7, 12 
subjects have switched from long to short commitment and by round 16 this number 
increases to 15, i.e. 26% of the 58 participants. The difference in switching frequencies 
is significant according to a 2χ -test (p < 0.01). This finding indicates that individuals 
are more eager to switch to more flexibility than to less flexibility. 
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Figure 4: Treatment Default – Cumulative number of subjects opting for alternative 
horizon 
 
Default 
  12 
However, even though subjects switch more often from the long horizon to the 
short horizon, the important message from Figure 4 is the fact that at least 74% (43 out 
of 58) of subjects stick to the long horizon when exposed to such a default. This 
frequency of voluntarily investing under the long horizon, i.e. with less flexibility, is 
significantly larger than the frequencies of subjects opting for the long horizon in 
treatment Endogenous, both compared to the No-Profit condition (p < 0.01; 2χ -test) 
and to the Profit condition (p < 0.05; 2χ -test). Hence, the behavioral intervention of 
setting a default fits the purpose of keeping subjects to invest under a long horizon with 
low investment flexibility. 
Figure 5 shows investment patterns in Default across rounds. We find again that 
subjects with the short horizon default (H1) always invest less in the risky lottery than 
subjects with the long horizon default (H3). Overall averages are 52.5 in H3 vs. 40.9 in 
H1 (z = 2.04, p = 0.02; Mann-Whitney U-test). 
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Figure 5: Treatment Default 
 
The opportunity to switch horizons allows also for a within-subjects test of the 
effects of horizons on investment decisions. Since only four subjects out of 58 switched 
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from the H1-default to the long horizon (H3), we cannot reasonably test for the within 
subjects differences in the H1-default. Yet, with the H3-default we have a total of 17 
subjects who experienced both H1 and H3 by at least switching once from H3 to H1. 
Interestingly, we find no differences in investment levels within these 17 subjects 
between H1 and H3 (with average investments of 51.5 in H1 versus 53.4 in H3; 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test, z = 0.83, p = 0.22). Hence, it seems that the initial default 
itself induces rather high investment levels which are not even significantly reduced 
when a subjects switches ‘back’ to the high flexibility condition (H1). Investments 
under the default H3 therefore seem to provide an anchor which is robust to switching. 
Finally, we have also checked whether those subjects who switched from the H3-default 
to H1 have different investment levels than those who did not switch. This is not the 
case. Comparing only investment levels under H3, we find no significant differences 
between those subjects who switched at least once and those who never switched (z = 
0.22, p = 0.42; Mann-Whitney U-test).8 
 
5. The determinants of behavior over time and across treatments 
Somewhat surprisingly, the previous experimental studies on MLA did not take the 
time pattern of investment behavior into account, most probably because their main 
focus was the aggregate effect of MLA. Yet, an analysis of investment behavior over 
time may yield some further insights into the determinants of investments, especially on 
the impact of a pre-determined versus a self-determined investment horizon Therefore, 
we have estimated a Tobit panel regression model where the dependent variable is the 
amount invested in the lottery, aggregated in rounds of three.9 As independent variables 
we take, first of all, the investment horizon (0 = H1, 1 = H3). Additionally, we consider 
several variables reflecting experience throughout the course of the experiment: 
                                                 
8
 We have also examined whether investment decisions differ between the Default treatment and the 
Exogenous treatment. Whereas subjects with a short horizon invest more in the Default treatment (45.9 vs. 
33.3, z = 1.89, p = 0.03), we find no significant difference for the long horizon (z = 1.31, p = 0.1 in H3; 
Mann-Whitney U-tests). 
9
 The aggregation is necessary since investment levels do not change for three rounds whenever the 
investment horizon is long (i.e. H3). 
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accumulated wealth up to the recent sequence of three rounds, the accumulated number 
of all previous lottery wins (ranging from 0 to a maximum of 9 in our sessions), the 
number of lottery wins in the previous period of three rounds (from 0 to 3). These 
variables allow us to examine how subjects react to past outcomes of their investments, 
which can be reasonably assumed to have an influence on investment behavior (also on 
real markets). Finally, we include dummy variables for the different treatments and 
conditions in our experiment.10 By additionally distinguishing the treatments with pre-
determined investment horizons (in Exogenous) from those treatments where subjects 
can endogenously choose their investment horizon (in Exogenous or Default), we can 
examine whether the option to choose the investment horizon has an impact on 
investment levels (controlling for the investment horizon itself). 
Table 1 reports three different model specifications,11 starting on the left-hand side 
with a full model, including interaction effects of the endogenous choice of the 
investment horizon (0 = exogeous, 1 = endogenous) and the different parameters 
capturing experience. The positive regression coefficient for investment horizon 
confirms that a longer investment horizon leads to significantly higher investments 
(which holds true in all model specifications). The negative coefficient of the number of 
wins in the previous block of three rounds suggests that individuals invest less risky 
after repeated gains, or vice versa, invest more risky after a repeated number of losses, 
resembling the house money effect. At the same time it supports myopia in that people 
react strongest to very recent gains and losses. The dummy for the exogenous treatment 
is significant and negative, indicating that a pre-determined investment horizon leads to 
a lower level of investments than a self-determined investment horizon. 
 
                                                 
10
 The condition H3F3 is excluded from the analysis, since the variation of investment horizon and 
feedback frequency does not allow aggregating the treatment with the other exogenous conditions H1 and 
H3, and the observations are too few for reasonably contrasting it with the other treatments. 
11
 The significant mean value of random errors due to unobserved individual heterogeneity ( uσ ) and the 
relatively high proportion of the error term in total residuals due to individual heterogeneity ( ρ ) both 
confirm the need of using a random effects model. 
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Table 1: Tobit panel regression on lottery investment 
Dependent Variable:  Full Model  Exogenous  Endogenous  
Investment [ ]100,0∈tiX   coef. Se  coef. se  coef. se  
Constant  45.32** 4.19  21.52** 4.32  46.12** 4.29  
Investment horizon 
(0 = H1, 1 = H3) 
 
46.53** 4.41  46.49** 4.24  17.37** 3.85  
Accumulated wealth  0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01  -0.01 0.01  
Number of all previous wins  -1.08 1.90  -1.09 1.72  5.40** 1.88  
Number of wins in previous three 
rounds 
 
-4.61** 2.22  -4.65* 2.07  -11.66** 1.40  
Treatment Exogenous  -24.28** 6.15  ―  ―  
Treatment Endogenous 
 – No Profit Condition 
 
4.29 5.82  ―  4.18 5.84  
Treatment Endogenous 
– Profit Condition 
 
-5.80 5.00  ―  -5.85 5.13  
Treatment Default  -6.59 5.35  ―  -6.46 5.68  
Choice * Horizon  -29.28** 5.66  ―  ―  
Choice * Accumulated Wealth  -0.02 0.01  ―  ―  
Choice * Number of all previous 
wins 
 
6.51* 2.63  ―  ―  
Choice * Number of wins in 
previous three rounds 
 
-7.01** 2.60  ―  ―  
2
uσ  
 38.28** 1.62  38.55** 2.86  38.38** 1.99  
2
iσ  
 21.99** 0.56  20.63** 1.03  22.43** 0.66  
ρ   
.75  .78  .75  
log likelihood  -4767.91  -1108.31  -3658.55  
# of observations  1295  300  995  
# uncensored /  
# left censored / 
# right censored 
 
943 / 87 / 265  225 / 23 / 52  718 / 64 / 213  
Significance levels: *  p ≤ 0.05 ** p ≤ 0.01 
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Several interaction effects between endogenous choice and the length of the 
investment horizon and the parameters of previous experience, respectively, reveal some 
fundamental differences between the exogenous and endogenous determination of the 
investment horizon. The third and fourth columns of Table 1 therefore show the Tobit 
regressions separately for exogenous and endogenous investment horizons, illustrating 
the nature of the interaction effects in the full model.  
The first fact to catch one’s eye from comparing the Exogenous with the 
Endogenous model is that the coefficient of the investment horizon is significantly 
larger in the exogenous treatments than in the endogenous ones. Obviously, the 
endogenous choice of the investment horizon seems to reduce the negative effect of 
myopic loss aversion on investments, but still does not eliminate it. The second 
noteworthy feature is that subjects react significantly to prior gains and losses when the 
investment horizon is endogenous, but much less so when the investment horizon is pre-
determined. Subjects in the exogenous treatment react more weakly to most recent gains 
and losses and do not react to former ones. Individuals in the endogenous treatments 
invest more cautiously the higher the number of recent wins (in the previous three 
rounds), but more risky the higher the accumulated number of previous wins. No 
differences between the three endogenous treatments can be found as indicated by the 
non-significant dummy variables. 
 
6. Summary and discussion 
Since the seminal paper of Benartzi and Thaler (1995) myopic loss aversion has 
been identified as one explanation why investors might invest less into risky assets when 
returns are frequently evaluated and the length of the investment horizon is rather short 
than when feedback frequency is lower and commitment to an investment level higher. 
In this paper we have tried to disentangle the causes of myopic loss aversion and to put 
forward possible cures for it. 
Whereas most previous papers have stressed the role of feedback frequency for 
MLA, attempts to disentangle the relative importance of feedback frequency and the 
investment horizon have only been undertaken recently – and independently from each 
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other. We have identified the length of commitment to a given investment as a crucial 
factor for the level of risky investments. With lower investment flexibility – and, thus, 
longer investment horizons – subjects invest more in the risky lottery, even if they 
receive frequent feedback on gains and losses. The same conclusions have been drawn 
by Langer and Weber (2003), who also found the investment horizon to be more 
important than feedback frequency. Bellemare et al. (2005), however, report the 
opposite results in that feedback frequency is relatively more important than the 
investment horizon. Though partly emphasizing different causes of MLA, the common 
denominator of all three studies is the fact that a manipulation of feedback frequency 
and/or investment flexibility leads to different investment levels. Given the consensus 
on this fact, it seems a natural next step to search for behavioral interventions to 
attenuate the effects of MLA. This has been the second – and main – focus of our paper. 
Looking at the aggregate distribution of choices, we have found no particular 
preference for either high or low investment flexibility among participants when they 
can endogenously choose the investment horizon. Rather, high or low flexibility is 
chosen almost equally often. Remarkably, even when subjects learn that longer 
commitment results, on average, in higher profits (via higher investments), no clear-cut 
preference for either horizon emerges. 
Setting the longer investment horizon as default (with a switching option) has been 
found to be a successful behavioral intervention that makes more than 75% of subjects 
stay with the long horizon and low flexibility. These subjects invest significantly more 
in the risky lottery than those subjects with a short horizon and high flexibility as 
default. This result is important for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that the effects of 
MLA also prevail when subjects can choose the investment horizon themselves. Hence, 
the influence of MLA is not restricted to settings where the horizon is exogenously 
determined by the experimenter, as has been the case in all previous studies. Second, the 
effects of MLA can actually be exploited by setting the long horizon as a default, 
thereby inducing higher investments (with higher expected returns). The latter result is 
remarkably similar to the effects of setting a default in 401(k) plan enrollment in U.S. 
companies. As Choi et al. (2001, 2003), for instance, have shown, enrollment in 
retirement savings plans is much higher (sometimes by a factor of four) when new 
  18 
employees are enrolled by default in the savings plan and when they have to opt out (by 
making a phone call to the personnel office) than when they have to opt in (also by 
simply making a call). In our experiment, we have found that at most 25% of subjects 
opt out from the long investment horizon. Opting out from the short investment horizon 
was significantly lower at about 6%, which indicates that subjects seem to have a 
preference for high investment flexibility, even though it is costly for them. 
Though the exogenous or endogenous determination of a subject’s investment 
horizon does not matter for the prevalence of MLA, a closer examination of investment 
patterns over time reveals that individuals who are able to choose their investment 
horizon endogenously react differently to prior gains and losses than individuals who 
were exogenously assigned an investment horizon. Subjects in the endogenous 
treatments react positively to a higher total number of previous wins, but negatively to a 
higher number of previous wins in the most recent three rounds. This suggests a belief 
in some kind of (short term) trend reversion, also known as gambler’s fallacy (e.g., 
Clotfelter and Cook, 1993). If the number of wins in the previous three rounds was high, 
one may expect it to be lower in the upcoming three rounds and therefore reduce the 
investments. However, in the longer term, if the number of previous wins was high (and 
therefore potentially also accumulated earnings) one may decide to risk more money, 
which is in line with the house money effect (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). 
In sum, it seems that subjects who choose the investment horizon themselves are 
more actively managing their investments, as they react significantly to past experience 
concerning losses and gains, whereas subjects with an exogenous assignment of the 
investment horizon seem much more passive and rather unaffected by past experience. 
An additional difference between endogenous and exogenous determination of the 
investment horizon has been found with respect to the magnitude of myopic loss 
aversion. When subjects have autonomy over their investment horizon (in treatments 
Endogenous and Default), the effect of myopic loss aversion is, on aggregate, less 
pronounced than when subjects have no autonomy. This, however, implies that all 
previous experiments with an exogenous assignment of the investment horizon may 
have measured an upper limit of the effects of MLA, since in the real world, investors 
can be considered to have a high degree of autonomy in determining their investment 
  19 
flexibility. It is important to stress, however, that even with full autonomy our results 
suggest that MLA negatively affects investment levels. Therefore, behavioral 
interventions – like setting a default – may be beneficial. 
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